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INTRODUCTION
The American legal system is structured so that private citizens by invoking
the law play a critical role in its enforcement. Any new authoritative rule, whether
statutory, judicial, or administrative, merely provides potential opportunities. In
practice, conferred rights are contingent upon the factors that promote or inhibit
mobilization of the law.' With enforcement highly dependent upon initiation of
the legal process by citizens, the factors that influence their decisions to invoke the
law are centrally important to the implementation of public policy. The Amer-
ican rule on attorney fee allocation is one such factor, for it determines the direct
financial burdens of legal representation.
The distribution of legality occurs largely outside public forums and without
the intervention of professional counsel. It proceeds by way of voluntary compli-
ance and through the assertion of legal rights by potential beneficiaries of the law.
In most cases the matter continues no further, because of satisfaction of the
demand or a decision that further pursuit of the issue is not worth the trouble. 2 To
say, however, that neither courts nor lawyers are directly involved in most mobili-
zation of the law is not to say that the nature of courts and the structure of the
legal profession play no role. For once the legal potential of an issue is recognized
and asserted, the threat of more formal legal action and the attendant power of the
state are incorporated into any continuing discussion. Therefore, substantive laws
and procedural rules do count-and they count well beyond the courtroom and
even the law office. This perspective is compatible with Mnookin and Korn-
hauser's view that private ordering-the bargaining process-is affected by legal
rules and procedures, that is to say, what would happen in court if a case were to be
filed and to proceed to disposition. 3 Thus, for example, the threat of formal legal
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action affects negotiated settlements of personal injury cases. 4 This is true in other
areas of the law as well.
However, the threat to use the law is a hollow one and therefore may not even
be made, when it is clear that the costs and complexity of pursuing a claim are
beyond the means or will of those who believe they have been wronged. More-
over, the power of the implicit or explicit threat to employ legal services and/or
formal legal structures can be diminished for reasons other than the capabilites
(financial and otherwise) of the one asserting a claim. The use of lawyers and
courts may, more generally, simply not be worth the time, effort, and cost. For
example, claims of less than several thousand dollars are rarely litigated, making
the threat of doing so a rather empty gesture. 5 In addition, unlike large monetary
claims that may be pursued on a contingency fee basis, suits seeking equitable
relief of even a very serious nature are inhibited by the anticipated high legal fees.
This is more likely to be true in the United States than in other Western nations.
The difference is due neither to a greater proportion of small claims nor to higher
costs of legal services here than elsewhere (although both of these may indeed
exist). Rather, it is a function of a mechanism for the payment of attorney fees so
unique that it is known as the "American rule."
II
THE AMERICAN RULE
The United States is the only common law jurisdiction in which attorney fees
do not follow the event. Absent an express statutory exception, each party must
bear the total expense of compensating his or her own attorney. The common law
rule that one whose rights have been violated should be made whole does not
operate, for one's recovery here (whether monetary or in the form of equitable
relief) is diminished by the amount paid in legal fees necessary to successfully
pursue a valid legal claim. It is this peculiarity that led one commentator to argue
that in the United States it is irrational to pay any debt in full. 6
The history of the American rule is extremely foggy. It is certainly more than
slightly curious that this particular structural component (the indemnity rule) is
not included among the many aspects of the English legal system that are at the
core of American law. Actually, it is not completely clear how, where, or when
various parts of the English legal system were adopted in the American colonies
and later in the states. That history is both too unclear and too diverse to consider
here.
It can be said that, at least at the national level, the American rule was pre-
sumed to be the general practice before the nineteenth century, for in 1796 the
4. See H. Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT (1970).
5. The exception of small claims courts only serves to prove the rule, with the establishment of a
specialized structural mechanism reflecting recognition of the general system's inability to meet a signifi-
cant legal demand. Indeed the documented record of the operation of small claims courts as forums for
debt collections further substantiates the point. Both the extensive use of default judgments and the econo-
mies of scale enjoyed by retailers and collection agencies avoid the problems most have in pursuing small
claims in court.
6. See Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite-The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1 (1970).
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United States Supreme Court disallowed the shifting of counsel fees that had been
granted by a lower court. The Court stated that
the general practice of the United States is in opposition to [the indemnity rule]; and even if
that practice were not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court,
till it is changed or modified by statute.
7
The force of time has done much to solidify the position of the American rule
at the state and national levels. 8 Recent statutory exceptions to the rule are still
considered exceptions, and the contemporary judiciary no longer questions the
"correctness in principle" of the American rule. In fact, the Supreme Court now
puts forth at least three arguments in favor of it: first, "since litigation is at best
uncertain one should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a law-
suit"; second, "the poor might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to
vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing included the fees of their opponent's
counsel"; and third, "the time, expense, and difficulties of proof inherent in liti-
gating the question of reasonable attorneys' fees would pose substantial burdens
for judicial administration." 9
Even the limited available history of the origins of the American rule makes it
clear that these are post hoc arguments made in defense of the now long-estab-
lished practice. Further, they are not by themselves very persuasive. There is no
real evidence to support these contentions, and even at the level of pure argument
they are weak. Indeed, the access argument, that fee shifting would adversely dis-
courage the poor from vindicating their rights, is made just as vigorously in opposi-
tion to the American rule. The most frequently voiced objection to the American
rule is that the burden of their own potential legal fees inhibits the poor from
asserting valid claims, particularly where the amount claimed does not justify a
contingency fee arrangement (and most claims of the poor do not). As a result, the
rights of the poor are left unvindicated. Indeed, this argument can be pursued one
step further to assert that by discouraging the poor from taking legal action the
American rule has the effect of actually encouraging violations of their rights: Of
course, the same could be asserted regarding those rights of the population as a
whole that involve only small sums or equitable claims.
As can be seen from the arguments both for and against the American rule, the
role of this seemingly minor structural variable turns out to be a rather compli-
cated issue.' 0 Only recently has its impact on access to the justice system and on
7. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dail.) 306 (1796). It is at least a bit curious that the lower court
did not adhere to this "general practice." Unfortunately there are no records of the lower court opinion
that might allow further inquiry.
8. See Leubsdorf, Toward a Hstory of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, LAW & CON1TENIP.
PROBS., Winter 1984, at 9.
9. Fleischman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
10. To the extent that any attention has been accorded to the effects on legal action of paying one's
own attorney fees, it has been concentrated on the choice between settlement and litigation, largely
ignoring the impact on legal mobilization more generally. See e.g., Blankenburg, Legal Insurance, Ltigant
Decisions and the Rising Caseload of Courts. A West German Study, 16 LAv & Soc'x REVIEW 601 (1981-82);
Shavell, Suit, Settlement and Trial.- A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs,
II J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982). Ehrenzweig's calls for fee shifting are exceptions. See Ehrenzweig, Reimburse-
ment of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 792 (1966); Enrenzweig, Shall Counsel Fees Be
Allowed', 26 CALIF. ST. B.J. 107 (1951).
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the distribution of legality begun to receive serious scholarly attention. Never-
theless, courts and legislatures continue to fashion substantial exceptions to the
American rule without rejecting outright either the rule or its validity. These
exceptions have been created-as is typical of changes in legal structures-in
response to political demands and in furtherance of well-defined public policy
goals.
This article, having briefly traced the historical background of the American
rule, will examine the judicial and legislative creation of exceptions to the rule.
The articulated normative purposes of these exceptions are to protect the integrity
and efficiency of the courts, to facilitate access to the legal process, and to
encourage the enforcement of certain substantive laws. Unfortunately, as this
review of the rule makes clear, there is no evidence as to the effects of the American
rule, or any of the exceptions, on these goals. Thus, judgments about the Amer-
ican rule must await answers to these empirical questions.
III
EXCEPTIONS TO THE AMERICAN RULE AS PUBLIC POLICY
Exceptions to the American rule can be readily dichotomized according to
source, strategy, and policy goal. The courts, the source of the earliest exceptions,
adopted fee shifting as a punitive measure to ensure the integrity of the judicial
process. Legislatures, on the other hand, have employed fee shifting as an incen-
tive to encourage enforcement of the law. In this scheme, fee shifting is typically
uni-directional and pro-plaintiff. It is a means by which legislatures eliminate or
minimize the economic disincentives that inhibit citizens from initiating legal
action to obtain the benefits provided by law. In the aggregate, these demands for
compliance have the effect of furthering enforcement of the laws by facilitating
citizen participation in the legal process. 12 Each of the policy goals-integrity of
the judicial process and enforcement of the law-will be considered in turn.
A. Integrity of the Judicial Process as Policy Goal
Fee shifting has always been allowed by judicial discretion as a punitive
measure against the filing of frivolous or bad faith suits. 13 Attorney fees may be
awarded to prevailing parties whose opponents have acted in bad faith, vexa-
11. The various arguments for and against the American rule and alternative forms of fee shifting are
described and analyzed with great proficiency in other articles in this symposium: In particular, see Rowe,
Predicting the Efects of Attorney Fee Shithng, LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBS., Winter 1984, at 139.
12. The legislative histories of administrative agencies and of the development of private causes of
action similarly reflect attempts to encourage enforcement. See Stewart & Sunstein, Pubh Pograms and
Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REx'. 1193 (1982).
13. However, there is no evidence of how often fee shifting is imposed as a punitive measure. If
judicial imposition of sanctions for failure to make discovery (under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure) is any indication, judges are quite reluctant to impose costs. See FEDERAL JUSTICE RESEARCH
PROGRAM, OFFICE FOR IMPROVEMENT IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JusTicE, A STUDY OF SANCTIONS
FOR DISCOVERY ABUSE 117 (1979) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL JUSTICE RESEARCH PROGRAMJ see also
R. RODES, K. RIPPLE & C. MOONEY, SANCTIONS IMPOSABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF IHE FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVI. PROCEDURE 85-87 (198 1).
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tiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.' 4 Consistent with the theme of sus-
taining the integrity of the judicial process, a party injured by willful violation of a
writ of mandamus or contempt of court order may also recover damages, including
attorney fees, from the recalcitrant party.'
5
As part of the concern for integrity of the judicial process, attention also has
been given to judicial efficiency. For if the judicial system does not operate with at
least a minimum of efficiency, it cannot perform its constitutional role. This effi-
ciency may be considered a necessary, though not sufficient, prerequisite to the
integrity of the judicial process. Most of the recent attention given to efforts to
decrease the burden on the courts (or to increase their efficiency, depending on
one's semantic preference) has focused on limiting jurisdiction, diverting minor
cases, and decreasing delay.16 Only very limited recognition has been given to the
fact that the American rule may itself be a source of inefficiency.
Concern with efficiency has been reflected in some discretionary fee shifting in
cases where the use of dilatory actions by the defendant is designed to protract
litigation until the plaintiff is worn to financial exhaustion.' 7 Fee shifting is justi-
fied in such cases because, "by affording a wealthy disputant unconscionable lev-
erage over an impecunious adversary . . . the no-fee rule may foster the use of
dilatory tactics."' 18 Of course, the alternative case of harassment by a wealthier
plaintiff can also occur.
An extreme example of legal harassment facilitated by the American rule
occurred in California after a biology professor testified at a public hearing against
a private development because of the deleterious effects it would have on wetlands
that provided refuge for numerous bird species. In response, the developer sued
14. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973).
15. See Public Partzcipation in Federal Agency Proceedings Act of 1977. Hearings on S 270 Before the Subcomm.
on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Comm. on theJudiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 677 (1977) (Awards of
Attorneys' Fees in Federal Courts and by Federal Agencies, paper submitted by Henry Cohen, Legislative
Attorney, Congressional Research Service). Another traditional exception to the American rule is the
common fund doctrine. It differs from other exceptions in that it disperses the cost of legal services among
all who share in the fund that has been created, increased, or protected and typically does not shift fees to
the loser. See, e.g., Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S.
527 (1882).
16. Chief Justice Burger has, for example, expressed strong views on limiting jurisdiction, finding
alternative mechanisms for the resolution of minor disputes, and the likely impact of both on delay. See
How to Break Logjam in Courts, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 19, 1977, at 21. For a recent discussion of
continuing efforts to promote alternatives to the public courts for so-called minor disputes, see Stanley,
Mnor Dispute Resolution, 68 A.B.A. J. 62 (1982). Delay is being addressed on a continuing basis in many
quarters, including an American Bar Association Commission to Reduce Court Costs and Delays.
17. Although there is no empirical evidence available, the willingness of judges to exercise this discre-
tion appears to be limited. Until such time as systematic evidence is gathered, conclusions about the effects
of fee shifting remain speculative.
18. Cohen, supra note 15, at 689 (emphasis added). For lawyers working on an hourly fee basis there is
an additional incentive (beyond aiding their clients) to use delaying tactics. An anecdote on point was told
years ago to a Stanford Law School audience by a senior partner of the prestigious law firm of Cravath,
Swaine and Moore:
I was born, I think, to be a protractor . . .I could take the simplest antitrust case and protract it for
the defense almost to infinity . . .[One case] lasted 14 years . . . .Despite 50,000 pages of testimony,
there really wasn't any dispute about the facts ...We won that case, and, as you know, my firm's
meter was running all the time-every month for 14 years.
Those Lawyers, TIME, Apr. 10, 1978, at 55, 59.
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for $80 million on the grounds of deprivation of use of property for lawful pur-
poses. Although the suit was unsuccessful, the five years of litigation cost the
defendants close to $20,000. Under the American rule, further litigation for mali-
cious prosecution was the only option available to the defendants to recover the
$20,000 that it had cost them to exercise their rights19
One variation on the theme of delay is the abuse of discovery procedures and
its contribution to the inefficiency of the judicial process. Nothwithstanding the
benefits of discovery to the substance of a case, under the American rule economic
incentives for some litigants (depending on certainty of success and staying power)
and for hourly fee-for-service lawyers encourage more and greater discovery.
Efforts to control discovery by the creation of sanction provisions, including a
shifting of attorney fees, are doomed to minimal effectiveness as long as economic
incentives operate as they do.20 In addition, there are two reasons that available
sanctions are rarely used.
The first limitation on the imposition of sanctions for discovery abuse is their
dependence on the initiation of a complaint by a lawyer operating in an adversary
system-a lawyer who may have previously employed or subsequently wish to
employ the same tactics. Secondly, the judge is forced to find actual abuse. That
is much easier to do under conditions of refusal to obey a discovery order than it is
for motions to request discovery. As a result, it is not surprising that the limited
available empirical evidence indicates that judicial sanctions are more likely to be
imposed for the former. 2i
The point is that delay tactics in general and excessive discovery in particular
are difficult to control under a punitive scheme of discretionary fee shifting.22 By
virtue of the cost-bearing scheme dictated by the American rule, delay, particu-
larly in low-risk cases, is less costly and is therefore encouraged. In contrast, it can
be argued that in high risk cases fee shifting provides an economic disincentive to
engage in delay. While such a disincentive would not eliminate these tactics, it
would influence their use and thereby affect the efficiency of the judicial process 23
It is possible that under a fee shifting rule a liable defendant in the run-of-the-
mill case would be subject to delay tactics by the plaintiffs in an effort to increase
fees and thus force a higher settlement. This problem is addressed in other juris-
19. See Diamond, Tra/ by Ftre Li*ves on in Ci'il Suils, L.A. Times, Nov. 27, 1980, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
20. Justice Powell, joined by Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, opposed the adoption of sanction
amendments to the discovery rules on the grounds that it would give the appearance of improvement
without providing any, and thereby diminish pressure to institute needed changes. Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521, 521-23 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting statement).
21. See FEDERAL JUSTICE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 13, at 4.
22. Judge Milton Pollack, an outspoken critic of discovery abuse, has urged more active trial judge
oversight of the discovery process to prevent the need for imposing sanctions. See Pollack, Discovery-Its
Abuse and Correction, 80 F.R.D. 219 (1979). While some federal judges share this view, it has not yet influ-
enced the behavior of most. See FEDERAL JUSTICE RESEARCH PROGRAM supra note 13, at 32.
23. Efficiency and judicial integrity are not the only bases for promoting a reduction in delay and
excessive discovery. An enforcement-related access to justice argument can also be made. For as delay and
discovery contribute to an increase in the costs (financial and otherwise) of using the courts, they conse-
quently reduce the effectiveness of the threat to do so and discourage compliance with the law.
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dictions by a mechanism limiting liability for attorney fees. 24 Under the British
indemniiy rule, for example, a defendant at any time has the option of "paying in"
an offer of a settlement. If the amount of the judgment does not exceed that offer
the defendant need not pay any portion of the winning plaintiff's attorney fees
incurred subsequent to the "payment in." Moreover, the plaintiff is liable for the
defendant's "post-payment in" fees. 25
A similar mechanism, intended to encourage settlements and avoid protracted
litigation, exists under Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides for an "Offer of Judgement." However, for unexplored reasons,
including in part both established practice and uncertainty as to how courts would
interpret Rule 68 (particularly whether costs awarded are to include attorney fees)
this procedure is rarely invoked.2 6 Without cases, of course, the rule will not be
interpreted, and that very uncertainty can be used to justify failure to invoke the
rule.27
The American rule on attorney fees may effect not only the length of each case,
but also the number of cases litigated. With litigants responsible only for their
own legal fees, as the amount claimed (and thus potential benefit) increases, the
American rule encourages some categories of litigation and discourages others.
With the risk limited to the fees of one's own attorney, a party is more likely to
pursue doubtful claims than if additionally threatened with paying opponents'
attorney fees. Therefore, the American rule provides economic incentives that pro-
mote higher risk and even spurious claims; defenses of questionable merit are simi-
larly encouraged. For the same reasons the American rule arguably encourages
the judgment-debtor not to pay settled claims, forcing the successful litigant to
accept something less than the judgment or to sue for collection, which in turn
increases the caseload. 28
Certainly, the case for or against the American rule cannot be made on the
basis of caseload without normative evaluations of the appropriate use of the
courts, for fee shifting would be expected to encourage some kinds of cases and
24. Under an indemnity rule, successful defendants, like those in the California biology professor's
case discussed previously, would be awarded fees and so would not need any special protection.
25. For a brief description of the payment-in system, see A. KIRALFY, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM
369-70 (1960).
26. Wright and Miller conclude that attorney fees are not included as costs unless specifically men-
tioned in the offer. See 12 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 57 (1973).
That conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the statutory definition of the
term "costs" as not including attorney fees. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386
U.S. 714, 720 (1967); see also Note, Rule 68. .4 "New" Tool for Ltigation, 1978 DUKE L.J. 889. But see
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 98 F.R.D. 339, 361-67 (1983)
(proposed revision of Rule 68).
27. A variation on the offer of judgement described in Rule 68 was proposed by Judge Robert Keeton
(then a Harvard law professor) to the ABA Action Commission to Reduce Court Costs and Delay. The
proposal calls for a mandatory exchange of offers in money damage cases with costs and attorney fees to be
borne by the party whose offer incorrectly estimates the value of the case as determined at trial. See
Nejelski, Allocation/Fee Shifting/Sanctions in the Proposed Framework for Settlement (1980) (Memo to
Commissioners, A.B.A. Action Commission to Reduce Court Costs and Delays). For a more detailed
explanation of the proposal and the Commission's suggested variant on it, see Mahan & Nejelski, Struc-
tured Settlement: How to Encourage Good Faith Negotiation Among Parties (1979) (Working Paper,
A.B.A. Action Commission to Reduce Court Costs and Delays).
28. See Adams, Would We Rather Fght Than Settle?, 51 FLA. B.J. 496 (1977).
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discourage others. 29 Furthermore, despite the arguments made, there is no empir-
ical evidence that either the integrity or the efficiency of the judicial process is
improved, or indeed affected, by exceptions to the American rule. While the
courts clearly have intended and fully expect that the threat of imposition of an
opponent's attorney fees deters inappropriate use of limited judicial resources,
there has not been any effort to establish clearly the existence of any such relation-
ship. Empirical evidence has simply played no part in the development of judi-
cially imposed exceptions to the American rule. However appropriate it may be
for courts to protect the integrity of the judicial process by the imposition of puni-
tive sanctions, there is only speculation as to their effectiveness. An examination of
fee shifting by legislatures will show that, like courts (albeit with different goals),
they too have proceeded to fashion exceptions to the American rule largely on the
faith that their efforts will encourage citizens to participate actively in the enforce-
ment of the laws by asserting their rights under them.
B. Enforcement as Policy Goal
Laws are to a substantial extent effectuated through the demands of their bene-
ficiaries. Thus, implementation of public policy and compliance with the law are,
in part, dependent upon the willingness and ability of the citizenry to assert their
rights under the law. However, the implementation and compliance literature has
focused almost exclusively on the incentives for compliance and the disincentives
for failure to comply. There has developed a substantial literature over the ques-
tion whether the carrot or the stick is the more effective tool to implement the
law. 30 Missing from the analysis has been consideration of the central role played
by the beneficiary of the law in initiating the process of legal mobilization, thereby
demanding compliance and threatening to use the power of the state to obtain it. 3 1
Much compliance occurs because of expected, implicit or actual threats to
employ the power of the state to enforce the law. Laws are thus most often imple-
mented without the intervention of legal professionals or the formal structures of
the justice system. Further, when legal professionals, regulatory agencies and/or
courts actually do become involved in the enforcement of public policy it is most
often in response to the demand of an aggrieved party who will benefit from
enforcement. 32
While much has been made of the limited access to justice of the poor, avail-
able evidence indicates that despite much of the rhetoric, most people who want to
see a lawyer do so. 33 Such evidence, however, does not provide any clues as to who
might want to use a lawyer if the fees were to be paid by their opponents. Nor
does it provide any indication of the limits that the structure of legal fees places on
the assertion of legal rights (and subsequent compliance). As one researcher exam-
29. For an analysis of the likely effects on case filings, see Rowe, supra note 11, at 147.
30. Neiman, The Virtues of Heavy-Handedness in Government, 2 LAw & POL'Y Q. 11 (1980).
31. The author had considered this point in much greater depth elsewhere. See Zemans, Legal Mobil-
za/ion." The Neglected Role of the Law ni the Political System, 77 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 690 (1983).
32. Cf R. KAGAN, REGULATORY JUSTICE: IMPLEMENTING A WAGE-PRICE FREEZE (1978).
33. See B. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC (1977); Mayhew, Institutions ofRepresentation, 9
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 401 (1975).
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ining the impact of Supreme Court decisions has commented, the "effectiveness of
a specific law depends upon the self-interest of lawyers to bother with it. ' '3 4 The
self-interest of lawyers to "bother" is of course directly related to the willingness
and ability of clients to pay them. Many matters are screened out of the legal
arena under the American rule precisely because it requires everyone to be respon-
sible for his or her own legal fees. In most cases the actual screening is done not by
the lawyers, but by potential litigants who determine that the possible benefit is
not worth the cost of legal fees. This perceived chilling effect has led to the
enforcement exceptions to the American rule.
1. Development of Enforcement Exceptions to the American Rule. It has long been
believed that the American rule may have an inhibiting effect on enforcement of
the law. Bad faith exceptions and the underlying arguments based on judicial
system integrity and efficiency have been made by courts probably as long as the
American Rule has been in operation. Enforcement exceptions to the Rule also
are not new. What distinguishes the history of enforcement exceptions is their
source. In contrast to bad faith exceptions, created by courts for the protection of
their own integrity, enforcement exceptions have traditionally been made by
legislatures.
An early example of a legislatively created mechanism to encourage private
enforcement of selected statutes appeared in the form of qut" tam actions. Under
statutes that establish civil penalties, private citizens were empowered to bring a
civil action and, if successful, recover a portion of the penalty for themselves. The
rights of qui tam plaintiffs, or informers as they were called, had to be derived from
the substantive statute they were seeking to enforce, with no rights to sue under
common law.35 Fee shifting, like qui tam, has been designed by legislatures to
encourage private enforcement. 36 For example, as early as 1887 Congress dictated
the mandatory awarding of attorney fees to successful plaintiffs injured through
violation of the Interstate Commerce Act.3 7 Since 1916 the Clayton Act has also
provided for a mandatory exception to the American rule. The statute states that a
successful plaintiff under it "shall recover. . . the cost of the suit, including a rea-
sonable attorney's fee." ' 38
As an alternative to mandatory fee shifting, some legislatures have given judges
the discretion to award attorney fees to prevailing parties. Consistent with the
policy of enforcement, these awards have usually been limited to prevailing plain-
tiffs. However, as an enforcement tool, and indeed as an inducement to compli-
ance (i.e., as a mechanism of deterrence), discretionary awards would seem to be
34. W. MUIR, LAW AND ATTITUDE CHANGE vi (1973).
35. See In re Barney Barker, 56 Vt. 14, 21 (1884).
36. The general idea of private enforcement has received much support from the growing law and
economics enterprise. See, e.g., Becker & Stigler, Law Enforcement, Mafeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3
J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974); Landes & Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1975). In
particular those who endorse that perspective oppose as inefficient the very growth of criminal and regula-
tory efforts at social control.
37. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 22 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-22,
25-27, 153 (1976)).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) (emphasis added).
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substantially less effective than a mandatory shifting of fees. Although an examina-
tion of statutory fee shifting language is appropriate, apparent distinctions
between "mandatory" and "discretionary" awards and between "one-way" and
"prevailing party" fee shifting may not be quite so clear in practice. Even without
the empirical evidence necessary to verify the practical implications of these dis-
tinctions, a review of a few court decisions makes clear the limits of extrapolating
from statutory language alone. The civil rights provisions provide a case in point.
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that the court "in its discretion
may allow the prevailing party . . .a reasonable attorney's fee." '39 Yet in Newman
v. Piggi' Park Enterprises, 40 the Supreme Court, in interpreting the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, held that a party seeking to enforce the rights protected by the Act, if
successful, "should ordinarly recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances
would render such an award unjust."' 4 1 In other words, the burden is on losing
defendants to convince the court that attorney fees should not be assessed against
them. The Court supported its interpretation that Congress intended to
encourage injured individuals to seek judicial relief by noting that if the intent was
only to assess attorney fees against defendants acting in bad faith, no statutory
provision would be necessary under long-standing federal court practice of
awarding. fees to successful plaintiffs where the defense has acted "in bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons."'42 The Court found similarly in
the context of Title VII litigation. 43 In both cases the Court interpreted the stat-
utes to provide for the ordinary awarding of attorney fees only to prevailing plain-
tf. The question of awarding attorney fees to prevailing defendants was settled for
Title VII cases when the Court found that "a district court may in its discretion
award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding
that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even
though not brought in subjective bad faith." '44 While that language is somewhat
more inclusive than the common law bad faith test that allows for awarding
attorney fees without any statutory authorization, it clearly leaves the balance
much in favor of the plaintiff.
Central to the Court's above-mentioned interpretation in the Piggie Park case
(that successful plaintiffs should ordinarily recover fees) was the determination
that seeking an injunction under Title II was not for the benefit of the plaintiffs
alone, but rather that they acted as "private attorneys general," vindicating a
policy "Congress considered of highest priority. ' 45 This view is consistent with one
part of the enforcement argument that has been particularly influential in the
passage of fee shifting statutes at the federal level. That is to say, the private
attorney general notion implies that the named plaintiff is acting on behalf of
some broader public and that fee shifting is provided legislatively for the purpose
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976) (emphasis added).
40. 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
41. Id at 402 (emphasis added).
42. See id. at 402 n.4.
43. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
44. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978).
45. 390 U.S. at 402.
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of advancing the public interest. It is, however, the courts rather than the legisla-
tures that have concerned themselves with whether a given statute meets the
public interest test. For it has been the courts and not the legislatures that under-
standably have felt the need to justify using their discretion to award attorney fees
where not legislatively directed.
It has been argued that the American rule is least defensible where Congress
has provided a private action and litigation protects the general public. 4 6 Given a
legal system that operates on a market model to the extent of being highly depen-
dent upon individual initiative, it could be argued equally persuasively that the
American Rule is indefensible on enforcement grounds for all statutory law. That
is to say, whenever a legislative body passes a law, it does so for public policy
purposes. Therefore, there is always a public argument to be made for encour-
aging its enforcement. The desirability of such encouragement is basically a polit-
ical decision. While such decisions may be defended in terms of the public
interest, there are no clearly recognizable criteria for identifying a statute that
furthers the public interest. Indeed a review of state statutes that include fee
shifting provisions reveals no such clear "public" dimension; for example, Section
6398 of the Texas Statutes allows for a shifting of attorney fees in an action to
maintain clean restrooms in railway stations.4 7
The Supreme Court's much discussed rejection, in its 1975 decision in Alyeska
Pzinehe Service v. Wilderness Society, 48 of a judicially created private attorney general
without express legislative authorization can in fact be viewed as a reassertion of
the traditional dichotomy between judically and legislatively authorized fee
shifting. It is the legislatures, the Court in effect stated, that make strategic polit-
ical decisions to provide for fee shifting as an incentive to encourage the bringing
of legal claims so as to promote the enforcement of selected laws. Indeed, the
Alyeska decision does not appear to be a deviation from any long-standing doc-
trine.49 A review of the cases cited in Wilderness Society v. Morton 50 (the appellate
court predecessor to Ajyeska) reveals that with the exception of Piggie Park5 I none
of them predates 1970.52 Although Justice Marshall in his Alyeska dissent asserts
that the Court "overstates the novelty of the 'private attorney general' theory," 53
the basic issue in contention appears to be the derivation of a "public" benefit
doctrine from a "common" benefit doctrine.
One long-standing judicially created exception to the American rule has been
46. See Note, Attomeys' Fees. Excepttons to the American Rule, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 717 (1976).
47. See Lorenz & Hunter, Financing Private Enforcement Through Statutes Authorizing Awards of
Attorneys' Fees, Council for Public Interest Law 21 (1979) (unpublished manuscript).
48. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
49. At issue is the question of fee shifting and not the matter of standing to sue, for which there is a
long tradition of the "public interest" litigant who lacks a personal stake in the outcome. See, e.g., Hen-
derson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950).
50. 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
51. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam). See supra notes 40-41 and
accompanying text.
52. There are earlier cases that make reference to the need to award costs in the interests of "doing
justice," though always with recognition that it is appropriate only in exceptional cases. See, e.g., Rolax v.
Atlantic Coast Liner Co., 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951).
53. 421 U.S. at 274 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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the concept of a common fund. Originally designed (for purposes of efficiency) to
apply to distributing the costs of litigation to all the beneficiaries of the result, it
has been developed over the years into a mechanism for more direct shifting of fees
for a common benefit where no monetary relief is granted.5 4 The courts have
based this form of fee shifting on the "original authority of the chancellor to do
equity in a particular situation. '55  In cases where courts have had to decide
whether a private right of action should be implied, they had to "similarly deter-
mine whether the special circumstances exist that would justify an award of attor-
neys' fees." '56 As such, these fee awards began to look more like an enforcement
mechanism, a use of fee shifting that traditionally had been eschewed by the
courts. Faced with demands for redress of grievances over violations of statutory
law, the court moved to an even broader public benefit framework by using "pri-
vate attorney general" language. But what distinguished Hall v. Cole and the other
so-called common benefit cases from the private attorney general concept argued
in Ayeska is the existence of a definable group benefitting from the litigation.
Indeed, the argued advantage of the private attorney general exception is precisely
that it avoids the need for an ascertainable class of beneficiaries required in the
common benefit cases.
The Court's objection to designating private attorneys general as articulated in
A'yeska is the resulting necessity for courts, rather than legislatures, to determine
just what qualifies a party for private attorney general status when the broader
public is the beneficiary of the enforcement sought in the courts. According to the
Court, it is not a judicial role to assess the importance of public policies involved in
particular cases. Rather, it is a legislative task to determine what policies are of
sufficient public interest to warrant fee shifting as an inducement to enforcement,
recognizing, as the legislature surely must, that one cost will be some degree of
overenforcement.
In fact, the Ao'eska decision is perfectly consistent with the origins of the private
attorney general concept. The phrase was apparently coined by Judge Frank to
denote the quasi-official status of a congressionally authorized plaintiff:
While Congress can constitutionally authorize no one, in the absence of an actual justici-
able controversy, to bring a suit . . . there is nothing constitutionally prohibiting Congress
from empowering any person, official or not, to institute such a proceeding. . . even if the
sole purpose is to vindicate the public interest. Such persons, so authorized, are, so to speak,
private Attorney Generals [sic.]5 7
Although Frank speaks of the vindication of the public interest, it is clear that he is
explaining the congressional decision to so authorize the bringing of litigation.
Evidence of Frank's presumption that the designation of a private attorney
general would be a legislative decision can be found in the precedents he cites,
54. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
55. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat. Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 (1939).
56. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391 (1970). It should be noted that this develop-
ment has been most pronounced in shareholders' derivative actions where the costs are distributed among
all shareholders through a fee award against the corporation. See id at 394. The difficulty of clearly
demarcating the difference between a corporation and its shareholders distinguishes these cases from tradi-
tional fee shifting between a loser and a winner.
57. Associated Indus. of New York v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943).
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including a Supreme Court decision affirming a qui lam action.5 8  Like the
"common informer," the private attorney general, while not directly injured by a
legal wrong, is authorized to bring suit to enforce the law. This is not a new
concept:
Statutes providing for actions by a common informer, who himself had no interest whatever
in the controversy other than that given by statute, have been in existence for hundreds of
years in England, and in this country ever since the foundation of our government.
5 9
What has been new in recent decades is the proliferation of legislation guaran-
teeing rights not readily attained by their intended beneficiaries, who are often
either unable to sustain litigation or for whom the personal benefit does not justify
the inordinate costs of litigation. As at other times, and over other issues, sup-
porters of this legislation sought a mechanism to encourage enforcement and until
A'yeska believed that they had found it in attorney fee awards to private attorneys
general. Congressional response to Ajyeska in the form of Civil Rights Attorneys'
Fees Awards Act of 197660 was a confirmation of legislative intent to provide a
mechanism-in this case a shifting of attorney fees-to encourage the assertion of
rights through private enforcement of the law.
It is surely true that many of the more recent federal statutes that include fee
shifting provisions do so for the express purpose of encouraging the vindication of a
specifically designated public interest. The Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards
Act of 1976 is a perfect example. Yet, as already mentioned, for quite some time
many federal statutes have authorized fee shifting in litigation between purely pri-
vate parties in areas such as bankruptcy, consumer protection, and patent and
copyright infringement. 6' The same is true at the state level.
A review of state statutes that authorize fee shifting indicates that they tend to
be unidirectional, providing for the awarding of attorney fees only to prevailing
plaintiffs rather than the prevailing party as under the British indemnity rule.
Those that do authorize fee awards to the prevailing party are more likely to be
discretionary than mandatory. This typical one-way shifting of fees to the pre-
vailing plaintiff is consistent with the general enforcement argument. 62 That is to
say, it is intended to have a deterrent effect by facilitating the assertion of rights
under law, including, if necessary, the bringing of litigation.
Fee shifting under these conditions is not as much an incentive to private
58. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943) (upholding the bringing of a qui lam
action under the Federal Informers Act, 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 231-34) (The Act has been recodified as amended
at U.S.C.A. §§ 3729-3731 (West 1983)).
59. Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
61. See Sands, Attorney's Fees as Recoverable Costs, 63 A.B.A. J. 510 (1977). For an extensive list of
federal fee award statutes, see R. ARONSON, ATrORNEY-CLIENT FEE ARRANGEMENTS: REGULATION AND
REVIEW 156 app. (1980).
62. Unidirectional fee shifting to prevailing plaintiffs would not deal with the problem raised by the
biology professor's case cited earlier. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the prevailing defendants would have been no worse off had there been statutorily authorized
unidirectional fee shifting to prevailing plaintiffs than they were without it and would still have had the
malicious prosecution option that they in fact exercised. A standard for assessing costs against a losing
plaintiff in Title VII cases could be somewhat beneficial. See, e.g., Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,
434 U.S. 412 (1978).
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enforcement as quil tam was; rather, awarding attorney fees effectively eliminates
the disincentive to enforcement that exists if there is no fee shifting. Yet legisla-
tures have not eliminated this disincentive in any systematic fashion. Instead, it
appears that legislative action on this issue as on any other, has been dependent
upon the persuasion of interested parties.63 This characteristic suggests what may
be the real source of enforcement exceptions to the American rule-political
demand.
2. Enforcement Exceptions as Responses to Political Demand. Legislatures typically
act, indeed as representative bodies they are supposed to act, in response to polit-
ical demands. The American political system has in fact often been criticized for
responding to every social ill with yet more legislation. The passage of legislation
may itself satisfy the demand, or at least dampen the potency of the political effort
that produced the legislation in the first place.
Ineffective implementation of previously legislated policies may generate fur-
ther political demands. These demands may include pressure for the creation of
enforcement incentives and elimination of enforcement disincentives. Responses
to demands for effective tools of implementation have included the creation of a
number of different structural features of the American legal system. Included
among these are contingent fee arrangements, class actions, small claims courts,
pro se actions, and treble damages in antitrust cases. 64 The same can be said
about the creation of regulatory agencies and the delegation of enforcement
powers to them, and the imposition of criminal penalties that carry with them the
publicly funded state prosecutorial apparatus. 65 Each of these has been created, at
least in part, in response to demands for more effective enforcement in particular
areas, and with the express purpose of encouraging and facilitating the pursuit of
claims. Of these structures, contingent fees are clearly the most direct response to
the demand for legal services perceived to be unmet by the distributive effects of
the American rule.
The primary argument offered in support of the contingency fee arrangement
is indeed relevant only because of every litigant's responsibility to pay his or her
63. It has been suggested that the reason for not extending fee shifting to prevailing defendants may
be a judgment that defendants are most often institutions, see Sands, supra note 61. According to one
review of state statutes that authorize fee shifting, liability does tend to be in
public and private institutions with litigation resources which tend to be far greater than those
enjoyed by most private citizens; that is to say, railroads, banks and other lenders of retail credit,
insurance companies, corporate management. . . . and state and local government agencices.
Lorenz & Hunter, supra note 47, at 21. Differentiation in rules and procedures for individual versus corpo-
rate actors, of course, is not unprecedented in the legal system. See J. RUHNKA & S. WELLER, SMALL
CLAIMS COURTS, A NATIONAL EXAMINATION (1978); Eovaldi & Meyers, The Pro Se Small Clains Court in
Chicago: Justice for the Little Guy, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 947 (1978).
64. There are, of course, other possibilities. For example, it has been suggested that the inadequacy of
governmental enforcement efforts requires the establishment of a taxpayer remedy to recover government
money lost through fraud. See Cherminsky, Fraud and Corruption Against the Government. A Proposed Statute to
Establish a Taxpayer Remedy, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1482 (1981).
65. See Adams,supra note 28; Ball & Friedman, The Use of Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement oEconomic
Legislation: A Sociologi al View, 17 STAN. L. REV. 197 (1965). Not all alternatives pursued to encourage
enforcement are legal structures. Adams, for example, speculates that frustration over the inability legally
to pursue legitimate small claims may be responsible for the consumer movement.
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own attorney fees irrespective of outcome. Contingency fee arrangements provide
a mechanism for obtaining legal representation when one has a legitimate claim,
but lacks sufficient means to pay for a lawyer. The promise of a portion of the
proceeds thus encourages representation. However, to describe the contingent fee
as a "method of insuring that all citizens can obtain needed legal representation '66
is to overstate its benefits and to fail to acknowledge its limited applicability. For
while it may be true that contingency fees developed from a need to finance legal
services for the working class, the need itself was a function of the American rule.67
With contingent fees meeting only part of the demand, other alternatives
emerged that have had the effect of meeting some of the limitations imposed on
legal action by the American rule. Class actions for example, by providing for the
pooling of many small claims, economically justified the use of contingency fees or
common funds to pursue claims otherwise ignored.68 Government agencies and
criminal prosecutions can similarly pool claims, but more importantly they
socialize the costs of representation. 69 It has even been argued that our increased
reliance on government agencies and criminal sanctions to enforce the law may be
a direct response to the American rule and its effects. 70 This is not necessarily to
argue that the American rule alone gave rise to these structural changes, but only
that some of the perceived need for enforcement left unmet by virtue of the Amer-
ican Rule has been met in part by these structures. Moreover, the claims for pri-
vate attorney general status and attendant fee-shifting indicate that there is still
substantial demand to minimize further the effects of the American rule.
Like contingent fees, reliance on government action too has additional effects,
not the least of which is the political screening of cases that voids the distinctive-
ness of litigation as a means of citizen access to government decisionmaking. From
an enforcement perspective, this may have the benefit of public as opposed to
privatized decisions as to the direction and intensity of the enforcement effort to be
pursued. However, it has been pointed out in a defense of private rights of action
generally, that
66. R. ARONSON, supra note 61, at 119.
67. An argument can be made that contingency fee arrangements are more advantageous than fee
shifting because there are no out-of-pocket costs at all and thus no inhibition of'claims out of fear of losing
and the accompanying burden of paying two sets of legal fees risked under an indemnity rule. It should be
noted, however, that lawyers' risk aversion limits the pursuit of high risk cases under contingency fee
arrangements. Furthermore, like every structural change, contingency fees brought with them other diffi-
culties including in particular a potential divergence of interest between lawyer and client. See, e.g.,
Johnson, Law.yers' Choice.- A Theoretical Appraisal of Littgation Investment Decisions, 15 LAW & Soc'y REV. 567
(1980-81); D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1974). For a more complete dis-
cussion of the contingent fee, see F. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES (1964).
68. According to Foster, class actions in the United States grew out of an equity tradition that "sought
to fashion new remedies where old ones have been shown to be inadequate," and that permitted "parties
before the court to speak for . . . the interests of absentees in order to avoid a failure of justice or to relieve
against unwarranted burdens." Foster, The Status of Class Action Litgaton, 4 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS
OF THE AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION 1 (1974). Class actions, like each of the structural changes men-
tioned, have had their critics, in large measure due to the alleged effects that follow from the ambiguous
nature of the attorney-client relationship in this form of litigation. For a discussion of this issue, see Devel-
opments-Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1577-1604 (1976).
69. For a discussion of the role of political demands in dictating the form of enforcement (civil or
criminal), see Ball & Friedman, supra note 65.
70. See Adams, supra note 28.
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in the implementation process, administrative bureaucracies sometimes tend to sacrifice the
diffused interests of widely scattered beneficiaries in favor of the interests of more cohesive
and better-organized groups.
7 1
This endorsement of private rights of action also implicitly favors fee-shifting
as an enforcement technique. First, without fee-shifting the right to a private
cause of action is in many cases meaningless. Second, since there is no public
agency designated to pursue claims under most statutes, without fee shifting their
beneficiaries are often left unrepresented. Pro-plaintiff fee shifting is another struc-
tural alternative to facilitate enforcement through individual demands for compli-
ance. As a result it has the secondary effects of promoting deterrence and
facilitating the implementation of public policy. In practice, recent attempts to
expand pro-plaintiff fee shifting have been closely tied to the more general effort to
provide easier access to legal services.
C. Fee Shifting and Access to Justice
It is of course not a new realization that without access to legal representation
many of the rights granted by law remain illusory rights. This is particularly true
where enforcement relies exclusively upon the initiation of civil actions by private
individuals. It is surely true that law serves an educative function7 2 and that some
compliance results from the mere fact that the state has authoritatively spoken. As
the author has argued here and elsewhere,7 3 however, a substantial portion of com-
pliant behavior is a response to an assertion of right by beneficiaries of the law. To
the extent that such assertions cannot effectively be backed by the power of the
state, those rights depend upon voluntary compliance. And where the cost of legal
services are prohibitive, the power of the state most often cannot be invoked effec-
tively. As discussed previously, the cost of lawyers' services may inhibit legal
action either because of the economic status of the claimant or because the claim is
too small to justify the investment necessary to obtain redress. Under the Amer-ican rule even the most meritorious of claims are so inhibited.
It has been suggested that the promotion of negotiated settlements by fee
shifting will result in a net increase in the utilization of legal services. 4 While this
may bring some comfort to the legal profession, more is implied. The greater use
of legal services also means an extension of services to different kinds of cases
(smaller claims) and categories of the population (the less well-to-do).
The access to justice argument, as traditionally defined to focus on exclusion
from the judicial system of categories of persons rather than of types of cases, has
been used to defend both the American rule and fee shifting. For example, the
American rule is often interpreted as representing a more democratic, even popu-
list position. 75 Yet a study of legal representation of people of moderate means
71. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 12 at 1294.
72. See Andenaes, The General Preventve Effects of Punzshment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 949 (1966).
73. See Zemans, supra note 31.
74. See Sands, supra note 61, at 515.
75. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. makes this argument, but it cannot be sustained on the basis of the obscure
historical record. See A. SCHLESINGER,JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON (1945). At minimum it can be said that
there was great variability in fee arrangements among the states and that, as mentioned earlier, the Amer-
[Vol. 47: No. I
IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
suggests fee shifting as one means of making legal services more readily available, 76
although without distinguishing between the effects of one-way and two-way
shifting of fees.
With legal service programs both overburdened and threatened with reduc-
tion, if not extinction, it has been further argued that awarding attorney fees
would allow the private bar to shoulder a significant share of the burden of repre-
senting the poor.7 7 Indeed, one critic of government funding of legal services for
the poor supports fee shifting as a preferable mechanism for providing adequate
representation. He argues that a direct subsidy encourages litigation, however mer-
itorious, by making it profitable for both plaintiffs and lawyers. 78
The access to justice consideration can also support the American rule. The risk
of losing and bearing the burden of paying two sets of attorneys fees may have a
chilling effect on litigation. Yet, although litigation is a risky business, a review of
court studies indicates that such fears may be exaggerated. For over a wide variety
of cases in a number of different American cities plaintiffs are generally the more
likely winners. 79 Of course, if the legal profession is acting appropriately this
would be the expected result, for it is the primary gatekeeper to the judicial process
and should advise clients to litigate only meritorious cases. The data indicate that
despite the riskiness of the adjudicative process, the screening process is operating
to limit the cases that come to court to those more likely than not to win.80
If one-way pro-plaintiff fee shifting does, as has been argued, increase the real
potential (though not necessarily the actual practice) of going to court, then the
incentive for asserting legal rights and initiating claims also increases. The limited
history of Title VII litigation, and the development of a private "Title VII Bar"
are testimony to the impact that pro-plaintiff (as the Court has interpreted Title
VII) fee shifting can have.8 ' Here too, however, with fees dependent upon a suc-
cessful outcome, cases not likely to win are screened out of court. For example, the
limited pursuit of individual Title VII claims (as opposed to class actions) by the
private bar reflects the inherent difficulty and consequent high risk in proving
ican rule was alleged by the Supreme Court to be the accepted practice, at least in the federal courts,
before the nineteenth century. See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 306 (1796).
76. See B. CHRISTIANSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS 293-94 (1970).
77. McLaughlin also suggests an exception for unsuccessful indigents' obligations to pay opponents'
attorney fees unless they acted in bad faith. See McLaughlin, The Recovery ofAttorneys'Fees A New Method of
Financing Legal Services, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 788 (1972).
78. See G. TULLOCK, TRIALS ON TRIAL, THE PURE THEORY OF LEGAL PROCEDURE 30 (1980).
79. See Eovaldi & Meyers, supra note 63; R. HUNTING & G. NEUWIRTH, WHO SUES IN NEW YORK
CITY? (1962); Wanner, The Public Ordering of Private Relations, Part Two: Winning Civil Court Cases, 9 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 293 (1975); Ruhnka & Weller, supra note 61, at 110-12.
80. That general advantage of the plaintiff and the presumption by legislators of its existence may in
part account for the high proportion of fee shifting statutes that award fees only to prevailing plaintiffs and
do not indemnify a winning defendant. The growth and nature of those statutes will be discussed later. See
infra text accompanying notes 84-108.
81. See Belton, Comparative Review of Public and Private Enforcement of Title VII, 31 VAND. L. REv. 905
(1978). In addition, a number of the so-called public interest law firms derive a substantial proportion of
their budgets from fee awards. The Legal Defunse Fund, for example, is said to derive about one-sixth of
its $6 million budget from attorney fee awards. Interview with Stephen Wasby, State University of New
York at Albany (Oct. 26, 1982) (discussing his research on LDF). For further references to the LDF
budget, see Nat'l L.J., June 7, 1982, at 2, col. 3 and Washington Post, May 25, 1982, at 1, col. 2.
Page 187: Winter 1984]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
discrimination in individual cases. Were one-way pro-plaintiff fee shifting to be
imposed in additional areas of the law, many of the perceived legal wrongs that
are not now pursued would be, and many of the claims now ignored by the wrong-
doer would not be.
Under the American rule the consumer or the disgruntled neighbor, for
example, is often faced with a "so sue me" response to a valid claim. With the cost
of legal fees for pursuing the claim prohibitive, given the size of many consumer
and neighborhood claims, there is no incentive for the violator to redress the
wrong. (Were it not for contingency fees, the same would hold true for larger
cases.) Accordingly, there is no incentive to avoid committing the legal wrong in
the first place. One objection to this line of argument is that at the same time that
pro-plaintiff fee shifting encourages legitimate claims, it may inhibit legitimate
defenses and so inappropriately shift the litigative balance.8 2 Another objection is
that pro-plaintiff fee shifting encourages frivolous cases and nuisance suits, further
exacerbating an already serious caseload problem.
Indeed, as noted in a review of recent books on the litigiousness of American
society, fear over caseload per se has grown to the level where "the State Bar of
Arizona actually argued that lawyer advertising should be banned because, if
people learned of their rights, use of the courts would be increased. '8 3
A telling anecdote from Jethro Lieberman's book on litigiousness describes a
suit filed by a twelve-year-old boy against a teacher who refused to pay for damage
he admittedly did to the boy's bicycle.8 4 This case would seem to be a perfect
example of the excessive litigation and misuse of judicial time that the State Bar of
Arizona feared and that has been at the core of the efforts to divert minor disputes
from the courts. Yet, it is the seeming pettiness of the case that demonstrates the
important role played by the threat of litigation in obtaining compliance with, and
enforcement of, the law. According to Lieberman, it was admitted that had it not
been for the filing of a lawsuit the acknowledged debt would not have been paid. 5
This case provides a nice example of the important role played by individuals
in encouraging compliance with the law by asserting their own rights. In the
aggregate, such individual claims are central to law enforcement. Structural vari-
ables such as attorney fee rules that encourage or inhibit such assertions ultimately
have an impact on the implementation of public policies. A more specific exami-
nation of statutory fee shifting will illustrate the legislative concern with enforce-
ment and access.
82. A variation on this problem occurs under the American rule in cases in which an individual or
small corporation must defend itself against the United States government. It is this problem that is
directly addressed by the Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, title II §§ 203-04, 94 Stat. 2325
(1980) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1982) and 28 US.C. § 2412 (Supp. 1981)), under which the government
must bear its opponents' attorney fees if the bringing of the original suit is determined to have been
unwarranted.
83. Andrews, Suing as a First Resort:. A Review of Marks's The Suing of America and Lieberman's The
Litigious Society, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 851, 860.
84. J. LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY 7 (1981).
85. See id.
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D. Legislatively Authorized Fee Shifting
In recent years there has been a geometric increase in legislatively authorized
fee shifting, particularly at the state level. According to one survey almost all
states have some statutorily provided fee shifting.86 Some legislative fee shifting
provisions, like the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, are direct
responses to demands for facilitating enforcement efforts that are perceived to be
inhibited by the American rule. As the concept of fee shifting gains acceptability,
substantive statutes are increasingly including-quite self-consciously for enforce-
ment purposes-fee shifting provisions from the outset. At the federal level these
include parts of such diverse statutes as the Organized Crime Control Act, 8 7 the
Freedom of Information Act 8 and the Consumer Product Safety Act.8 9
The breadth and diversity of state fee shifting are enormous. Some states have
instituted fee shifting on a very large scale, either generally or with reference to a
large category of cases. The most extensive fee shifting legislation is found in
Alaska, where costs, including attorney fees, are allowed to prevailing parties in all
cases unless the court directs otherwise.9° Although fee schedules are tied to the
monetary value of the case, trial judges in practice enjoy a great deal of discretion
in granting awards. The State of Washington has recently passed legislation to
provide for attorney fees (as fixed by the court) as costs to the prevailing party in
actions for damages of five thousand dollars or less. 9 1 This particular statute
clearly speaks to precisely that category of cases left without representation under
the American rule even with contingency fees allowable. Yet, by providing for
two-way fee shifting it also may have the effect of inhibiting the bringing of claims
by the threat of a losing plaintiffs having to pay two attorneys' fees. 92 Arizona
now provides for courts to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party
in "any contested action arising out of a contract, express or implied. '93
Most states, however, have adopted fee shifting provisions on an issue-by-issue
basis. They range over virtually every topic imaginable. In New York, for
example, the prevailing plaintiff recovers attorney fees in contests over fraudulent
jewelry appraisals. 94 In Minnesota a mandatory awarding of fees is provided for
unfair dairy trade practices. 95
Many of the fee award statutes are clearly intended to tip the litigation balance
to compensate somewhat for the inordinately unequal economic status of dispu-
86. See Lorenz & Hunter, supra note 46.
87. Pub. L. No. 91-952, 84 stat. 922 (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
88. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1977 & Supp. 1983).
89. Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 380 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 42
U.S.C.).
90. See Note, Award of Attorneys'Fees tn Alaska: An Analsis of Rule 82, 4 U.C.L.A.-AL sKA L. REV. 129
(1974).
91. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.84250 (Supp. 1982).
92. It is unclear the extent to which the Washington statute, by providing for prevailing-party
awards, acts largely to balance pro-creditor confession of judgment clauses. This, like much of what has
been claimed in support of fee shifting, remains an unexplored empirical question.
93. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-341.01 (1982).
94. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 239-c (McKinney Supp., 1982).
95. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 32A-09 subd. I (West 1981).
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tants. This phenomenon is a function of political demand being a source of excep-
tions to the American rule. Such demand often comes from a populist/consumer
perspective. As a result, business institutions and government bodies are fre-
quently made liable for attorney fees when they are unsuccessftil in litigation. In
Michigan, for example, only a prevailing debtor is entitled to attorney fees in cases
alleging violations of the collection practices act. 96 In Florida, only the prevailing
taxpayer is entitled to fees in cases arising out of sales of certificates by tax collec-
tors on land on which taxes have been paid.9 7 The Uniform Residential Landlord
and Tenant Act (URLTA) also includes a number of fee shifting provisions. 98 The
Ohio statute, for example, provides for attorney fee awards to the tenant or the
landlord in selected situations;99 according to one study, tenants are the chief bene-
ficiaries.10 0 In contrast to some traditional provisions (e.g., the standard residential
lease in the City of Chicago) that provide only for pro-landlord one-way fee
shifting, the Uniform Act (in statutory form in at least some states) seems to reflect
the growing political influence of the tenant movement. Consistent with the
enforcement (and deterrence) hypothesis, governments are in some statutes the
beneficiaries of fee awards. In California for example, it is mandatory that pre-
vailing government plaintiffs be awarded attorney fees when violations of the
terms of building contracts by contractors have occurred. I0 1 Hundreds more stat-
utes could be cited. 102
In addition to increased legislative consideration, if not acceptance, of fee
shifting has come the serious attention officially given to it by the American Bar
Association. The ABA's Consortium on Legal Services and the Public went so far
in 1977 as to recommend a general shift to an indemnity rule (although with
important limitations) to the Association's House of Delegates.10 3 Strong opposi-
tion from various quarters within the Association led to a revised and much
watered down proposal the next year. The new proposal, also recommended by
the Special Committee on Public Interest Practice, basically provided, with some
limitation, for a shifting of fees to private parties who prevail against the govern-
ment. 104 The content was substantially the same as that passed by Congress in the
Equal Access to Justice Act.105
Perhaps the best evidence that fee shifting affects enforcement efforts is pro-
96. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.257(2) (West Supp. 1982).
97. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 197.121 (West Supp. 1982).
98. UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT (amended 1974).
99. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5321.01 -.09 (Page 1981).
100. See McIntyre, URLTA in Operation: The Ohto Experience, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 587.
101. CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 5101 (West 1984).
102. For a survey of the more than 1900 state fee shifting statutes, see Note, State Attorney Fee Shifting
Statutes.- Are We Quietly Repealing the American Rule?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 321.
103. American Bar Association Recommendation and Report to the House of Delegates from the
Consortium on Legal Services and the Public, Rep. No. 117 (Aug. 1977).
104. American Bar Association Recommendation and Report to the House of Delegates from the
Consortium on Legal Services and the Public, Rep. No. 129 (Feb. 1978); American Bar Association Rec-
ommendation and Report to the House of Delegates from the Special Committee on Public Interest Prac-
tice, Rep. No. 130, (Feb. 1979). The ABA Section on Litigation withdrew its own recommendations (Rep.
No. 124) and supported those presented by the Consortium.
105. Equal Access to Justice Act §§ 4, Pub. L. No. 96-481, title II, §§ 203-04. 94 Stat. 2325-29 (1980)
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1982) and 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (Supp. 1981)).
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vided by recent federal legislation intended to control abuses of excessive enforce-
ment. The Equal Access to Justice Act purports to control abuse by regulatory
agencies through one-way fee shifting against the government. 10 6 Actually, the
deterrent effect of this fee shifting on government abuse is not clear, since the
burden of attorney fees does not fall on the official who makes the decision to
pursue a case. Rather the statute specifically states that it is intended "to diminish
the deterrent effect of seeking review of, or defending against, governmental
action" by providing, in specified situations, costs against the United States,
including attorney fees. At the same time it seeks to redress felt burdens of exces-
sive enforcement efforts by a government with virtually unlimited resources
against individuals and businesses whose more limited means deter them from
asserting their rights.
Concerns about the impact of fee awards are apparently behind the Reagan
Administration's efforts to restrict severely both the incidence of fee shifting and
the size of the fees awarded. Proposals from the Office of Management and
Budget have met strong opposition from both public interest law firms (whose
activities they are in large measure intended to curtail) and from the American
Bar Association.'0 7 Here, as with other arguments over the wisdom of fee shifting,
there is little or no evidence of the effects of the provisions being variously attacked
or defended. In the case of the Equal Access to Justice Act, for example, available
evidence indicates that its use has been too minimal to provide the basis for any
meaningful evaluation of its effects; from October 1, 1981, through June 30, 1982,
only thirty petitions for expenses and fees were even filed, of which thirteen were
granted by the federal courts.' 0 8
Ignorance of the actual effects of fee shifting has not kept legislatures from
adopting it in response to pressure to achieve particular goals. For example, fee
shifting may tend to decrease the filing of high risk cases. Therefore, identifiable
categories of cases that are typically high risk could be discouraged by providing
for fee shifting. With that in mind, the Florida Medical Association persuaded the
Florida legislature to enact a law' 0 9 requiring a shifting of liability for attorney fees
to the losing party in medical malpractice cases.110 The doctors expected that the
high success rate they enjoy in these cases would, under the new rule, have the
effect of limiting medical malpractice claims (and therefore settlements and insur-
ance costs).
While high risk claims might decrease, however, there would also be an
increase in the small, but low-risk (high-certainty) claims that had not been worth
pursuing (given the burden of legal fees) under the previously applicable Amer-
106. See U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Equal Access toJustice Act, S. REP. No. 253, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
107. See Nat'l L.J., Nov. 29, 1982, at 1, col. 4; Statement on Behalf of the American Bar Association
Before the Subcommittee on Agency Administration of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United
States Senate Concerning Proposals to Amend the Equal Access to Justice Act (Dec. 9, 1982) (mimeo
available at ABA Governmental Relations Office, Washington, D.C.).
108. 51 U.S.L.W. 2446 (Feb. l, 1983).
109. 1980 Fla. Laws 67 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN § 768.56 (West 1982)).
110. See Bodine, Losers Get Legal Tab in Florida, Nat'l L.J., July 7, 1980, at 1.
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ican rule. Moreover, under the new rule, a plaintiff was recently awarded attorney
fees of $4.4 million in addition to the jury awarded damages of $14.47 million. I 11
Such an increase (35%) in the insurance company's tab is the exact opposite of the
medical society's intent.
This example provides a perfect illustration of the central role of political
demands in this as in other legislation. Liability for the payment of legal fees,
however distributed, has an impact on use of the legal system. And since that
entails using the power of the state for selected purposes, it is an advantage many
would like to claim. It also illustrates both the complexity and unpredictability of
fee shifting.
IV
CONCLUSION
Who receives the protection and benefits of the law is an important normative
question in a democratic society. The allocation of legal rights may be an authori-
tative statement of appropriate behavior, but it is not the equivalent of actual
implementation. The judicial system plays a direct role in the implementation
process by providing a forum for the individual citizen to invoke the power of the
state to enforce a law of which he or she is a beneficiary. Indeed, the very existence
of the courts and the implicit threat to use them are often sufficient to evoke sub-
stantial compliance.
Access to the use of state power through the courts has been a continuing
matter of concern, and not only for the poor or those identifiable categories of
persons sometimes defined as "underrepresented." l 2 In response to demands for
greater access, numerous legal structures have been devised and/or modified
through the years for the purpose of encouraging the use (and effective threat of
use) of the formal legal process. The American rule that disallows fee shifting
except under unusual circumstances is one such structure. Like other legal struc-
tures that control the use of law, exceptions to it have emerged over the years.
These exceptions are, in large measure, a result of political decisions about the
appropriate level of enforcement of various laws.
Like other legal structures, the American rule has been manipulated to achieve
particular policy goals. Exceptions to it have been variously used as carrots or
sticks to promote selected ends. Judicial exceptions have been largely in the form
of the stick to punish inappropriate use of the judicial process-in particular bad
111. Von Stetina v. Florida Medical Center, Inc., No. 81-5946 (Fla. Cir. Ct., Broward County, 1982).
This case is of further interest because of the circuit court's apparent basis for calculating the attorney fee.
In contrast to the typical multipication of hours worked by the fair market value of legal services, the judge
in this case seems to have considered the 40% contingency agreement (50% on appeal) between lawyer and
client. This approach could have important implications for the effect of fee shifting statutes in areas of the
law in which legal fees traditionally are calculated as a percentage of the award rather than on an hourly
fee basis. The district court of appeal, however, rejected the use of a contracted-for contingent fee per-
centage as a basis for the fee award and reduced the award to a "reasonable" fee of $1.5 million. 436 So.
2d 1022, 1031-32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). The case is currently on appeal before the Florida Supreme
Court (Case No. 64,237).
112. See J. HANDLER, LAWYERS AND THE PURSUIT OF LEGAL RIGHTS (1978).
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faith and vexatious suits. Legislatures, on the other hand, have held out fee awards
as a carrot to encourage the implementation of laws that they have determined
need incentives to promote enforcement. Although these exceptions have a long
history, the demand for the fulfillment of rights perceived to be ineffectively
enforced has begun to focus more recently on the American rule. It must be noted,
however, that arguments in favor of fee shifting as a means of effecting a more
equitable enforcement of the laws typically neglect two very important limitations.
First, discussions of fee shifting exclude from their purview a large protion of
the legal business, even the official legal business, of a society. For even under the
British indemnity rule, under which attorney fees most closely follow the event, fee
shifting is applicable only in contentious matters. 113 In noncontentious matters
one is, of course, responsible for his or her own legal fees, irrespective of outcome.
The importance of this limitation is usually ignored in discussions of the appro-
priate rule to govern attorney fees and the likely impact of fee shifting were it to be
more widely adopted. Due to both the adversarial format of the legal system and
the great interest in the law as it contributes to the resolution of disputes, it is often
forgotten that much of the work of lawyers and even of courts is noncontentious. 114
With no recognizable adversary to whom fees could be shifted, the entire question
of fee shifting is thus irrelevant to the distribution of the bulk of legal services.
The second limitation is a function of a lack of knowledge. There are many
"true believers" in the wisdom of fee shifting and just as many who hold an
opposing view. However, their beliefs are essentially matters of faith. Fee shifting
provisions have very simply never been empirically evaluated. Although the ten-
dency in this country to limit fee shifting to one-way pro-plaintiff awards is consis-
tent with the incentive structure that underlies the enforcement argument, and it
is true that selected examples such as Title VII enforcement support the hypothesis
that such fee shifting will encourage the implementation of the law, it is very diffi-
cult to generalize.
As the court cases interpreting Title II and Title VII so clearly illustrate, statu-
tory language alone may not be enough to determine how fee shifting will be
employed. Indeed, even under explicit legislative mandates for fee shifting, courts
have often been accused of relying on their own traditional bad faith requirements
for the awarding of attorney fees, continuing to view it as largely a punitive rather
than an enforcement mechanism. Where legislatures have allowed for judicial dis-
cretion, bad faith criteria may be even more likely to be used as the basis for fee
awards. Despite careful argumentation, much of it presented in this symposium
issue, the fact of the matter is that we simply do not know the effects of attorney
fee awardg. As noted in these discussions, the effects are likely to vary substantially
depending upon the nature of the case and the litigants. Moreover, it must be
113. See ROYAL COMMISSION ON LEGAL SERVICES, FINAL REPORT 550 (1979). According to one
estimate, noncontentious work accounts for 80% of solicitors' income. Most of that is attributed to convey-
ancing (transfers of real property) over which solicitors have a monopoly. See R. JACKSON, THE
MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 418 (1972).
114. See Engel, Legal Pluralsm in an American Communiy: Perspectives on Civl Trial Courts, 1980 AM. B.
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 425; Friedman & Percival, A Tale of Two Courts: Litigation in Alameda and San Benito
Counties, 10 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 267 (1976); Zemans, supra note 31.
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recognized that there are three distinct sets of actors whose decisions are likely to
be affected (and not necessarily in the same way) by fee shifting: litigants, lawyers,
and judges. Each needs careful consideration. Any serious attempt to answer the
empirical questions would be an enormous undertaking, but with the new flurry of
interest in fee shifting in this country, at both the state and federal levels, we have
an obligation at least to begin the inquiry. Although that task is well beyond the
scope of this issue, it is a task that warrants undertaking so that the debates over
the benefits of attorney fee shifting can be based on evidence rather than faith
alone.
